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ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG: A Step Backward in
Equal Protection, or a Justifiable Affirmation of
Congressional Power?
The Supreme Court in Rostker v. Goldberg upheld a Congressional deci-
sion which excluded women from registration for service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. Although the case was brought based upon
equal protection grounds, the majority took a separation of powers stance
and based its decision upon the fact that the Court has traditionally
granted deference to the decisions of Congress in the area of military af-
fairs. The minority opinions disagreed with the majority's analysis and
claimed that the central issue in Rostker was not military in nature, but
was that Congress' plan to register males only, promoted gender based
discrimination.
In this unique presentation, both sides of the Rostker case are analyzed
and argued by two authors. One author argues that even though Rostker
does involve elements of gender based discrimination, the decisions of
Congress in the area of military affairs warrant deference by the Court.
The other argues that the evolution of the equal protection standards, and
the precedents arising therefrom, should have dictated the outcome in
Rostker. In addition, each author discusses the possible impact Rostker
will have on future Court decisions as well as the women's movement gen-
erally. The decision as to which analysis is correct is left to the reader.
I. INTRODUCTION
At a time when equal rights for women were paramount in the
minds of many people in this country, the United States Supreme
Court, in Rostker v. Goldberg,1 decided that American women
would not be required to register for the draft even though men
were compelled to do so. 2 The decision in Rostker can mean one
1. 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981). Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and
Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion. Justices Mar-
shall and White dissented, joined by Justice Brennan.
2. The registration for males was required under the Military Selective Serv-
ice Act, 500 U.S.C. § 453 app. (1976). Section three of the Act provides in pertinent
part, that:
Except as otherwise provided in this title it shall be the duty of every
male citizen of the United States, and every other male person residing in
the United States, who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subse-
quent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to pres-
ent himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and place
or places, and in such manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of
the President and by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder.
Id.
In President Jimmy Carter's State of the Union Address on January 23, 1980, he
of two things. Either it is an end of the Court's advance on equal
protection in sex discrimination cases, or it is a stumbling block
on the road toward an expanded concept of equality for men and
women.
3
The Court was faced with a balancing of power between the leg-
islative and judicial branches of government. 4 The majority opin-
ion tipped the scales decidedly in favor of the legislature, giving
great deference to the congressional findings in this case.5 This
deference dictated the outcome of Rostker. On the other hand,
the dissent reasoned that the decision was not in accord with the
Court's equal protection precedents.6 By diverging from the prec-
edential path, the Court may have turned its back on the chang-
ing social and economic roles that women play in today's society,
or it may have defined where the changing role of women cur-
rently stands.
This note will examine the meaning of the Rostker decision and
whether the conclusion reached was a correct one. Both sides of
the argument will be presented by separate authors. It will be
left up to the reader to decide which argument is correct. But re-
gardless of one's stand on the issue of whether women should be
called for the draft registration process to begin due to the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan and the lack of military preparedness under an all volunteer force.
President's State of the Union Address, 16 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 194 (Jan.
23, 1980).
3. See generally Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right
to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 718 (1971) (rejected idea that males are superior administrators); Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (stereotypical notion that men are primary
supporters of women as a basis for Air Force benefits rejected); Kahn v. Shevin,
416 U.S. 351 (1974) (statute perceived as remedial for some women and harmful to
none); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (statute intended to compensate
Navy women for specific differentials favoring men); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (statute found unconstitutional which prohibited the sale of beer to males
under 21 while females were allowed to make purchases at 18); Califano v. Gold-
farb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (support criteria applied to widowers but not widows held
to be gender based discrimination); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (rejected law
which required only males to pay alimony); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979)
(invalidated gender line drawn in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
Unemployed Fathers program); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142
(1980) (struck down statute requiring widowers, not widows, to show dependence
before receiving Workmen's Compensation benefits); see also text accompanying
notes 39-97 infra.
4. This is not to say that the executive branch is "inferior"; but rather, the
executive branch is not dealt with here for the sake of simplicity. It is felt any dis-
advantage caused by such an omission is outweighed by increased clarity in ex-
pression of the concepts involved.
5. The Constitution provides Congress with the power to raise and support
an army for defense. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 12 & 14. Thus, the judicial branch
pays careful attention to congressional decisions in this area. See, e.g., CBS, Inc.
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973).
6. See note 3 supra.
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required to register for the draft, the Court's decision in this area
of equal protection touches upon traditional ways of life embed-
ded in the origin of this nation.7 As society changes, 8 so do tradi-
tions, but whether the Court or whether the Congress should
affect or reflect that change remains a matter of law and opinion.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE-FACTUAL PERSPECTIVE
In June of 1971, four draft-aged males, individually and as a
class, sought the convention of a three-judge Court9 to decide the
constitutionality of the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA).o
After a number of challenges were directed at the MSSA" and
denied, the district court granted a Government cross-motion to
dismiss the complaint12 on the ground that Congress is vested
with the power to declare warl3 and, therefore, the power to pro-
mulgate, select, and maintain military forces.14 This is provided
for constitutionally as well as statutorily in the MSSA.15 The dis-
trict court regarded the plaintiffs' assertions as "a frontal attack
on the draft itself. What [was] sought [was] a declaration of un-
constitutionality as to the MSSA in toto ... ,"16 The district
court concluded there was no jurisdiction17 and dismissed the
suit.18
7. Thomas Jefferson wrote that all men are created equal. But when ques-
tioned about women he said: "Were our state a pure democracy, there would still
be excluded from our deliberations . . .women, who, to prevent deprivation of
morals and ambiguity of issues, should not mix promiscuously in gatherings of
men." M. GRUBERS, WOMEN IN AMERICAN PoLrrcs 4 (1968).
8. The notion of holding onto the status quo has disappeared as a national
aspiration according to comparative polls carried out in 1964, 1974, and 1980. Amer-
icans seem to be accepting change as a way of life. In 1964, 12% polled generally
favored holding onto the status quo, whereas, in a 1980 survey, none of the respon-
dents favored retaining the status quo. Watts, The Future Can Fend/or Itself, PsY-
CHOLOGY TODAY, Sept. 1981, at 48.
9. Rowland v. Tarr, 341 F. Supp. 339, 340 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
10. See note 2 supra.
11. 101 S. Ct. at 2650 n.2. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the MSSA
constituted a taking of property without due process, imposed involuntary servi-
tude, violated rights of free expression and assembly in its application, was unlaw-
fully implemented in the pursuit of an unconstitutional war, and that the MSSA
discriminated along sexual lines.
12. 341 F. Supp. at 343.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
14. 341 F. Supp. at 342 (extensive case history).
15. See notes 2 & 13 supra.
16. 341 F. Supp. at 342.
17. Id. at 343.
18. Id.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed every
claim of the plaintiffs except the one asserting an equal protection
violation.19 The case was then remanded to the district court to
decide whether the discrimination challenge was substantial
enough to justify convening a three-judge court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 228220 and whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue.
The district court ruled affirmatively on both counts.2 1
As a result, a three-judge court was convened to hear the issue
of whether the MSSA unlawfully discriminated against draft-age
men. In denying a Government motion to dismiss the claim, on
July 1, 1974, the court ruled that, although the authority to draft
registrants had expired the year before, obligations connected
with registration still applied to the plaintiffs. 22 When President
Ford proclaimed the end of registration on March 19, 1975,23 the
lawsuit lapsed "into a state of suspended animation."24 A few
years later, when a court clerk suggested the case finally be dis-
missed, current discussion of renewing registration triggered ad-
ditional discovery and the case again became active.
On February 11, 1980, President Carter, in response to various
world events,25 recommended that Congress appropriate the
funds necessary to reinstate a draft registration program. 26 In ad-
dition, he suggested the MSSA be amended to permit the inclu-
sion of women in such a scheme. After much debate, Congress
refused to amend the MSSA but did grant the funds necessary to
register males.2 7
The day before President Carter signed a proclamation reinstat-
ing draft registration for nineteen and twenty year old males, the
19. Rowland v. Tarr, 480 F.2d 545, 547 (3d Cir. 1973).
20. The statute authorizing three-man District Courts is no longer effective.
"The Act authorizing three-judge courts to hear claims such as this was repealed
in 1976, Pub. L. 94-381, §§ 1 and 2, 90 Stat. 1149 (Aug. 12, 1976), but remains applica-
ble to suits filed before repeal, id., § 7, 90 Stat. 1120." 101 S. Ct. at 2650 n.2.
21. Rowland v. Tan-, 378 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
22. Id. at 768.
23. Presidential Proclamation No. 4360, 11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 318,
(Apr. 7, 1975), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 453 app. at 1994 (1976).
24. Roberts, Gender-based Draft Registration, Congressional Policy and Equal
Protection: A Proposal for Deferential Middle-Tier Review, 27 Wayne L Rev. 35, 38
(1980).
25. Most notable was the crisis created in Southwestern Asia when the Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan.
26. President's State of the Union Address, 16 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc.
198 (Jan. 23, 1980); see Note, Women and the Draft: The Constitutionality Of All-
Male Registration, 94 HARv. L. REv. 406 (1980). It was reasoned by the Adminis-
tration that such a policy change would be viewed as a sign of America's strength
and its willingness to defend America's worldwide interests.
27. H.R.J. Res. 521, Pub. L. No. 96-282, 94 Stat. 552. See S. REP. No. 96-789, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 nn.1 & 2 (1980).
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district court proceeded with the litigation. The plaintiffs argued
that:
[T]heir rights to equal protection of the law, as that concept is included in
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, are violated in that males
only are subject to registration for the draft and therefore there is an in-
creased probability of the male plaintiffs actually being inducted because
the pool of draft eligibles is decreased by the exclusion of females.
2 8
In other words, the plaintiffs alleged that they were harmed by
this "gender-classification"; a classification that cannot be justi-
fied under applicable standards of constitutional review. 29
After deciding that the case was ripe and that plaintiffs had
standing to sue, 30 the district court proceeded to apply the "im-
portant governmental interest" test of constitutionality. The court
framed the issue in terms of whether or not excluding women
from the registration scheme was substantially related to an im-
portant governmental interest.31 The district court did not agree
that the justifications offered by the Government for an exclu-
sively male draft registration were substantially related to the
achievement of any important governmental interests. 32 Accord-
ingly, the court found the sex based classification to be
unconstitutional.
Following this announcement, the government sought out Jus-
tice Brennan, the Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit. The fol-
lowing Saturday, from his home on Nantucket Island, Justice
Brennan granted a stay of the district court order.33 The next
Monday, registration of draft-age males went forward as sched-
uled, pending appeal to the Supreme Court.34
28. Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 588 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
29. Id. The courts, however, have consistently rejected this contention. See,
e.g., United States v. Cook, 311 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1970); United States v. Clin-
ton, 310 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. La. 1970); United States v. St. Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
30. 509 F. Supp. at 588-89.
31. Id. at 605. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), which discusses an "im-
portant government interest" test formulated to weigh the purpose of legislation
against the means employed to carry it out. See notes 71-76 supra and accompany-
ing text.
32. 509 F. Supp. at 605.
33. Ironically, though he had earlier stayed the ruling of the lower court, Jus-
tice Brennan concurred with Justices White and Marshall in dissenting from the
Court's reversal of the lower court ruling. Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2661
(1981).
34. Id. See N.Y. Times, July 22, 1980, § A, at 3, col. 2; N.Y. Times, July 19, 1980,
§ A, at 1, col. 6. Due to the current widespread failure to register, President Rea-
gan is re-evaluating whether it should be continued, although the Selective Serv-
III. EQUAL PROTECTION AND GENDER BASED DISCRIMINATION:
AN EVOLUTION
A. What the Warren Court Left Behind
The Warren Court left substantial precedent clarifying and de-
fining the so-called "two-tiered" 35 approach to equal protection is-
sues. Put simply, the Warren Court initially adopted a
permissive, or "rational basis," test and later developed a "strict
scrutiny" test in response to the need for greater coherence be-
tween the means and the ends of legislation.36 The "rational ba-
sis" test dictates that a legislative classification must be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective in order
to survive judicial scrutiny.3 7 The "strict scrutiny" test is less per-
missive in its view of the relationship between legislative means
and ends. It requires that classifications be necessary for the ac-
complishment of compelling governmental objectives. Classifica-
tions which have been held to signal the application of the "strict
scrutiny" test are said to be "suspect"38 or are described as those
which infringe on "fundamental rights."39 Thus, the Warren
Court, while paving the .path toward racial justice, expanded the
shelter of the equal protection umbrella 40 so that it encompassed
a more inclusive standard of equality.4 1
ice has stated that this is not evidence of rebellion, just procrastination. L.A.
Times, Nov. 5, 1981, at 1, col. 5.
35. See generally Roberts, supra note 24.
36. The Equal Protection Clause did not become a viable tool for striking
down legislation until the advent of the "strict scrutiny" test in the 1960's. This
was due to the fact that the "rational basis" test offered little or no protection. Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For A Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Camara, 451 F.2d 1122 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1074 (1972); United States v. Clinton, 310 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. La. 1970); Sus-
kin v. Nixon, 304 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ill. 1969); United States v. St. Clair, 291 F. Supp.
122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
38. Classifications deemed suspect include those which discriminate according
to race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and national origin Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
39. Rights defined as fundamental include the right to vote, Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), and the right to interstate travel, Memorial Hosp. v. Mari-
pocopa, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
40. The Warren Court had greatly expanded the area of equal protection, but
had not really dealt with gender based discrimination. Ginsburg, Sex, Equality
and the Constitution, 52 TuL. L. REV. 451, 457 (1978).
41. The Warren Court did not advance equal protection in the area of gender
based discrimination, but it did set the stage for the Burger Court to take the his-
torical step of invalidating a law which discriminated among people solely on the
basis of sex. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Johnston, Sex Discrimination
and the Supreme Court 1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 617 (1974). Accordingly, this
article focuses only on those gender discrimination cases of the Burger Court
leading up to Rostker.
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B. Searching for the "Middle Tier"42
The Burger Court, characterized as conservative, 43 restrained"
and noninterventionist,45 followed some trends of the Warren
Court but was slow to acknowledge the Warren Court's progress
in the equal protection area.46
The first sex discrimination case the Burger Court heard was
Reed v. Reed.47 Reed involved a state statute which gave
mandatory preference to appointing males as executors in the ad-
ministration of estates. The Court,48 in a unanimous opinion, held
that, although lowering probate costs and avoiding familial con-
troversies were legitimate state objectives, 49 these objectives
were not sufficient to support the arbitrary distinction between fe-
males and males, contrary to the Equal Protection Clause. The
Court did not apply either the "rational basis" or "strict scrutiny"
tests.5 0 In fact, the Court did not articulate exactly what test it
was applying. The Court seemed to find the "two-tiered" ap-
proach insufficient for sex based classifications and was beginning
to search for a middle ground level of review with regard to gen-
der classifications.
In Frontiero v. Richardson,51 a female Air Force officer claimed
her husband as a dependent in order to receive increased bene-
fits. Her claim was denied. Wives of military men were automati-
cally accorded dependent status under the statute, but husbands
of military women had to meet specific criteria. The Court, in an
eight to one decision, ruled the statute to be in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. Justice Brennan, writing the plurality
opinion,5 2 declared that sex was a "suspect" classification, com-
42. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 45.
43. See Forum, Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 645, 648 (1975).
44. Ginsburg, supra note 40 at 457.
45. Id. But see Forum, supra note 43 at 657. For a comprehensive discussion
of the Burger Court, see Gunther, supra note 36.
46. Id. Roberts, supra note 24, at 50.
47. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
48. At the time of the Reed decision, the Court had seven members. Justices
Rehnquist and Powell joined the Court in 1972. See 404 U.S. at iv.
49. 404 U.S. at 76.
50. Id.
51. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
52. Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall joined in the majority opinion writ-
ten by Justice Brennan declaring that sex was a suspect classification and there-
fore subject to the "strict scrutiny" test. Id. at 682. Justices Stewart, Powell,
paring it to race and national origin. Race and national origin,
Justice Brennan wrote, are characteristics over which one has no
control and "which frequently bear no relation to ability."5 3 Con-
sequently, the government's justification of administrative con-
venience5 4 could not meet the compelling governmental interest
requirements of the "strict scrutiny" test.
Although five justicess5 refused to declare sex a "suspect" clas-
sification in Frontiero, the Court again seemed to be applying a
stricter standard of review than the "rational basis" test. Perhaps
a sign of the Court's growing involvement in the issue of gender
based discrimination was its choice to redefine the legislation to
provide equal benefits to families of military women, rather than
totally invalidating it.
In 1974, Kahn v. Shevin 56 added to the confusion over what
standards the Court was using to decide sex discrimination is-
sues. In Kahn, a widower attacked a Florida statute giving tax ex-
emptions to widows but not to widowers. The Court upheld the
law because financial difficulties are greater for widows than for
widowers and the state's purpose was to compensate for previous
economic discrimination against women. The exemption, the
Court noted, was remedial and, in any event, it helped some wo-
men while harming none.57
Three cases followed in the wake of Kahn: Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard,58 Stanton v. Stanton,59 and Weinberger v. Wisenfeld.6o In
Schlesinger, the Court held it was constitutional to require male
naval officers to conform to the "up or out" regulation (out if
Blackmun, and Chief Justice Burger concurred but found it inappropriate to de-
cide whether sex was suspect at this time. Justice Rehnquist dissented.
53. Id. at 686.
54. Id. at 688. Previously in Reed, the court had stated that administrative
convenience would not be justification for discrimination based on sex. See text
accommpanying notes 47-50 supra. In Frontiero, the Air Force claimed that men
were generally not dependent upon their wives for support. Therefore, instead of
requiring proof of all spousal dependency, the Air Force automatically granted in-
creased benefits to husbands claiming on behalf of their dependent wives. Alter-
natively, a wife claiming a husband as dependent had to prove his dependency.
This was done in an effort to decrease the amount of administrative work involved
in issuing benefits.
55. See note 52 supra.
56. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
57. Justices Brennan and Marshall would have upheld the legislation had it
prescribed a narrower "need" test. Id. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Only Jus-
tice White claimed the gender based tax exemption to be unconstitutional. Id. at
360 (White, J., dissenting). The opinion seemed to ignore the issue of whether the
legislation was paternalistic and stigmatized women, thus preventing any change
from the status quo.
58. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
59. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
60. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
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passed over twice for promotion) while giving female naval of-
ficers a period of thirteen years before discharge for lack of pro-
motion. On the average, this practice allowed women to stay in
the Navy four years longer than men.61 Justification for this dif-
ference rested on the fact that promotion possibilities were
smaller for women due to their exclusion from service in combat
positions. Because of the less frequent opportunity for promo-
tion, the Court held that the classification was permissible in that
women and men were not similarly situated.62
A Utah statute allowing a father to end support payments to a
daughter at eighteen and a son at twenty-one was challenged in
Stanton. The Court found that the statute imposed "criteria
wholly unrelated to the objective of the statute."63 Thus, the
Court once again skirted the issue of a "middle tier," saying that
it "perceived nothing rational in the distinction drawn by the
Utah statute."64
In Weinberger, Justice Brennan writing for the majority, ex-
amined the purpose and effect of a social security rule allowing
greater benefits for women.65 The Court found the statute deni-
grated the status of women and perpetuated the stereotype that
men are the primary wage earners. In overturning this statute,
the Court framed its ruling as upholding the rights of women.66
61. Repeating the argument that sex classifications should be suspect, Justice
Brennan observed that the statute simply based one gender based discrimination
on another, that of prohibiting women from combat positions. 419 U.S. at 511.
62. 419 U.S. at 508. After this, some commentators felt that women were being
offered the best of both worlds. The Supreme Court was ready to strike down
classifications that discriminated against women, yet the Court preferred statutes
that favored women. However, others believed these were the sort of stereotypical
products of legislation that women must fight against because they portrayed wo-
men as dependent, weak, and as needing husbands in guardian roles rather than
as peers. Ginsburg, supra note 40 at 465-66.
63. 421 U.S. at 14.
64. Id. (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)). At first, the Court seems
to apply a stricter standard by looking behind the legislative reasons for differenti-
ating between males and females. However, the Court's conclusion was that there
was nothing "rational" in the classification. This demonstrates that the Justices
still had aspects of the "rational basis" test in mind. See, e.g., note 37 supra.
65. Although many laws purport to benefit women the effect often can be that
of reinforcing stereotypical roles from which women want to break free. See gener-
ally Note, supra note 26; Steele, Males Only Draft Registration: An Equal Protec-
tion Analysis, 11 CuM. L. REV. 295 (1980); Committee on Federal Legislation, If the
Draft is Resumed: Issues for a New Selective Service Law, 36 REcoRD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 98 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Committee on Federal Legislation.].
66. Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 (1975).
Weinberger seemed to follow the Frontiero approach instead of
the Kahn approach. The Court in Weinberger retreated from
Kahn67 by applying a more stringent standard to determine legis-
lative purpose. It appeared that when legislation discriminated
against women,68 such as in Reed, Frontiero, and Stanton, or rein-
forced sexual stereotypes, such as in Weinberger, the Court re-
viewed it with a demanding skeptical eye. However, if the legisla-
tion favored women,69 such as in Kahn and Schlesinger, the Court
seemed more permissive in its examination. Although no actual
test was articulated from the time of Reed to Weinberger, the
Court clearly ap'peared to be taking a harder look at sex based
legislation.70
C. Finding the "Middle Tier": Craig v. Boren
Appropriately, Justice Brennan wrote the decision in Craig v.
Boren,71 which finally articulated the new "middle tier."72 Craig
involved an Oklahoma statute which allowed females to purchase
beer at eighteen, while males had to wait until they were twenty-
one. The Court's new test stated that classification by gender
must substantially relate to an important73 legislative objective. 74
67. The Court's pertinent language is worth noting:
The mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an auto-
matic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purpose
underlying a statutory scheme. Here it is apparent both from the statu-
tory scheme itself and from the legislative history... that Congress' pur-
pose in providing benefits to young widows with children is not to provide
an income to women who were, because of economic discrimination, un-
able to provide for themselves. Rather, . . . , [the statute] linked as it is
directly to responsibility for minor children, was intended to permit wo-
men to elect not to work, and to devote themselves to the care of their
children. Since this purpose in no way is premised upon any special dis-
advantages of women, it cannot serve to justify a gender-based distinction
which diminishes the protection afforded to women who do work.
420 U.S. at 648.
68. Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
69. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), where a law denying cus-
tody of illegitimate children to surviving male parents, yet which granted custody
to surviving females, was held unconstitutional.
70. Two concerns limited the celebration of the equal treatment proponents.
First, Justices Rehnquist, Marshall, and Brennan were the only justices who voted
with absolute consistency from 1971-1975, with Justice Rehnquist voting always to
sustain discriminatory laws. Second, there was an absence of unanimity on the
Court since Reed. Johnston, supra note 41 at 688-89.
71. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See also note 70 supra.
72. Some commentators have even called it an "upper middle tier." Ginsburg,
supra note 40 at 468.
73. 429 U.S. at 197. Cf. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979), which involved
a challenge to a legislative judgment under the "rational basis" test.
74. Thus, "important" is greater than "legitimate" and less than "compelling,"
[Vol. 9: 441, 1982] Rostker v. Goldberg
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An appropriate standard for judging statistical evidence was not
explained in detail, yet the Court did present a lengthy discussion
of the evidence, all of which was outside the legislative history of
this statute.7 5 It is also significant that the Court adopted the
"middle tier" approach in a case involving gender based discrimi-
nation against males because, previously, the court had been pri-
marily concerned with cases involving legislation which
discriminated against women.
Thus, in 1976, the process which began with Reed culminated in
the definition of a new test to be used when reviewing legislation
challenged on the basis of gender discrimination. The "important
governmental interest" test was less stringent than Justice Bren-
nan's declaration in Frontiero that sex was a "suspect" classifica-
tion. Yet, it was much more than the "rational basis" test which
had formerly been applied to gender discrimination situations. 76
D. After Craig v. Boren
Two cases, shortly after Craig, demonstrated that the Court
was not as harmonious as it had appeared to be on the issue of
gender based discrimination. Califano v. Goldfarb77 invalidated a
social security provision which automatically allowed a widow
survivors' benefits and forced a widower to show that his wife
contributed at least one-half of the couple's support in order to re-
ceive such benefits. 78 Although the legislation was perceived as
favoring women, the Court viewed it as economic discrimination
against men and societal discrimination against women.79
After Goldfarb came Califano v. Webster,80 which held constitu-
from the "rational basis" and "strict scrutiny" tests, respectively. Again, "substan-
tial" is more stringent than "rational," but is less than "necessary."
75. 429 U.S. at 200-04, 201 n.10.
76. Previous cases applied the "rational basis" test to gender-discrimination
issues. See, e.g., United States v. Baechler, 509 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 993 (1975); United States v. Yingling, 368 F. Supp. 379 (W.D. Pa. 1973);
United States v. Dorris, 319 F. Supp. 1306 (W.D. Pa. 1970); United States v. St.
Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
77. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
78. Id. at 208-09.
79. There are over 800 provisions in the United States Code which discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex. The double-edged sword of discrimination is particularly
apparent in the Social Security Act. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(b),
(c), (e), (f), (g) (1976). See also The Equal Rights Amendment is the Way, 1 HARv.
WOMEN'S LJ. 19, 22 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Equal Rights].
80. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
tional a remedial social security provision giving higher benefits
to female wage earners. The Court upheld the legislation because
it was based on other than "archaic and overbroad generaliza-
tions" 81 about women's societal roles. Although at first glance the
Court's decisions seem confused in this area, one thing is clear:
the purpose of the legislation was being examined in a coherent
fashion to see exactly what the intent of the legislation was.
An example of acceptance by the Court of a "more generalized
justification for striking down gender based distinctions" 82 is the
case Orr v. Orr.83 An Alabama statute allowing alimony for wives
only was found to discriminate against both men and women.
Justice Brennan, in the majority opinion, stated that "legislative
classifications which distribute benefits.., on the basis of gender
carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the
'proper place' of women and their need for special protection."84
With this decision the Court indicated that it is incumbent upon
the judiciary to look to the legislative purpose of the laws and to
be aware that legislation which embodies traditional stereotypes
and strict gender based roles is limiting the potential of men and
women.
Immediately following Orr came Califano v. Westcott,85 in 1979,
and Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co.,86 in 1980. West-
cott invalidated the gender based line drawn in the Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children, Unemployed Father's program.
Prior to the Court's decision, the law allowed benefits to families
of unemployed fathers but did not allow benefits for the families
of unemployed mothers.8 7 Again, the Court recognized in such a
law the presumed inferior position of the female wage earner.8 8 It
is significant that the Court involved itself in a non-contributory
welfare statute89 and struck it down due to gender based
discrimination.9 0
Wengler involved another statute which presumed that all wo-
men are dependent upon their husbands for income. A Missouri
81. Id. at 317 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)).
82. Roberts, supra note 24, at 50.
83. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
84. Id. at 283.
85. 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
86. 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
87. See note 79 supra.
88. 443 U.S. at 88.
89. Previously, the court had deferred decision in the area of non-contributory
welfare because it was considered well within the area of divorce, which the Stan-
ton case dealt with. See Note, supra note 26, at 409-10 n.32. See also Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
90. Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (upholding A.F.D.C. restric-
tions); Dandrige v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (same).
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statute automatically gave widows survivor's benefits but re-
quired widowers to prove dependence on their wives' earnings. 91
The Court decided eight to one92 that the law was unconstitu-
tional. Based on precedent, 93 the Court applied the "important
governmental interest" test, concluding that many women are not
dependent on their husband's income,94 making a case-by-case
determination more appropriate. 95
Thus, the chain of cases since Reed shows a willingness on the
Court's part to strike down gender based discrimination laws. In
addition, any justification of the purpose of legislation needs to be
supported by factual evidence conclusively showing a substantial
relationship between the gender based classification and the gov-
ernmental objective.96 The application of the "middle tier" test
seemed relatively certain in the cases of gender based discrimina-
tion before the Court. However, that is not to say all gender dis-
crimination statutes were automatically struck down under the
new test. Remedial purposes 97 and deferential interests such as
tax 98 were areas in which the legislature was able to differentiate
between men and women to achieve its objectives. It is with this
background that the Court encountered Rostker v. Goldberg.
IV. ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF THE ROSTKER DECISION
On June 25, 1981, the Supreme Court reversed the district
court's holding in Rostker v. Goldberg.99 Properly construed, the
Court's holding stated that the MSSA's registration provision did
not transgress fifth amendment protectionsOO and Congress, in
calling for the registration of men and not women, acted well
within its constitutional power to raise and regulate military
91. The Court found the law entailed "discrimination against women wage-
earners and surviving male spouses." 446 U.S. at 151.
92. Id. at 153 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 150.
94. Husbands were the sole wage-earner in only 24% of United States married
couples in 1979. This figure is down from 30% in 1974. Cory, Tin Pan Alley's
Housewife Fantasies, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept. 1981, at 25.
95. 446 U.S. at 152.
96. The Court said in Wengler that "two other requirements must be met-
proof of actual legislative intent, and factual proof that the distinction or presump-
tion underlying the law is valid." Id.
97. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
98. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
99. See note 1 supra.
100. Id. at 2658.
forces.1 0 ' Absent any true constitutional violation by the MSSA
with which to deal, the conclusionary notions advanced by the
district court proved shallow. Justice Rehnquist commented on
the disregard shown the wishes of Congress by the district court
in an area where "Congress is permitted to legislate both with
[significant] breadth and [even] greater flexibility."10 2 He also
pointed to an evident failure by the district court to "recognize
that the Constitution itself requires . . . deference to congres-
sional choice"10 3 in military matters. "[J]udicial deference to
[the] congressional exercise of authority is at its apogee when
legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and
support armies and make rules and regulations for their govern-
ance is chalenged."'10 4 The district court, in the majority's opin-
ion, had failed to properly assess the effect of its holding on such
a policy and thereby exceeded its authority.105
Most certainly the majority accommodated an act of Congress.
The controversy is focused in part on whether this practice side-
stepped a prevailing responsibility to decide constitutional ques-
tions. Justice Marshall, in dissent, voiced the opinion that by
deferring to the congressional decision, the majority evaded a re-
sponsibility to "safeguar[d] [the] essential libert[y]"lo 6 of equal
protection under the Constitution's fifth amendment. On the
other hand, Justice Rehnquist, in speaking for the majority, ex-
pressed the sentiment that the Constitution dictated the Court's
choice of action.
101. Id. at 2660.
102. Id. at 2652 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974)).
103. Id. at 2653. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103
(1973).
104. 101 S. Ct. at 2654.
105. By not deferring to the judgment of Congress, the district court broke with
a consistent and recurring feeling expressed in other district court decisions. Id.,
at 2653 n.6. See also Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L REV.
1065, 1125. "Ordinarily, the legislative judgment, which ideally expresses the har.
monized outlooks of the various groups in the community, is entitled to considera-
ble respect in its evaluation of proper objectives for state action and rational
means for attaining them." Id. Justice Marshall's interpretation of the district
court ruling was quite different from that of Justice Rehnquist. He felt that the
Constitution, the supreme law of the land under which all legislation must abide,
placed the Court in a position to override the decision to exclude women in the
draft registration plan offered by Congress. He accused the Court of "pushiing]
back the limits of the Constitution," 101 S. Ct. at 2676 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 104.(1958)), in order to accommodate the congressional decision. With em-
phasis on the guarantee of equal protection under the Constitution, Justice Mar-
shall challenged the validity of a gender distinction in a registration scheme and
concluded that the exclusion of females exceeded limits prescribed by the Consti-
tution. In consequence, he decided affirmation of the district court holding was
appropriate.
106. Id. at 2664 (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1967)). See
Home Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
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A. Rationale of the Majority
The backbone of Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion107 was
that when ruling as to the constitutionality of a congressional act,
"the Court accords 'great weight to the decisions of Congress.' "108
He quoted Justice Frankfurter'0 9 when making the point that in
judging a congressional decision as to its constitutional "correct-
ness," the Court needs to remember that such a decision was
made in a coequal government branch by members sworn to up-
hold the same Constitution as is the judge. When the constitu-
tional issues behind legislation are specifically and thoroughly
addressed in Congress,lO "customary deference"'11 is often ap-
propriate. The Court is hard pressed to find otherwise if the legis-
lation is clear.
The deference due Congress in Rostker was even more pro-
nounced. "The case arises in the context of Congress' authority
over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other
area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference." 112 Un-
derstanding the focus of Justice Rehnquist's approach as the im-
portance of judicial deference due Congress within the separation
of powers is critical in analyzing the Rostker decision.
1. The Deference Issue
Conceptually, "deference" is held to impart a yielding in opin-
ion, judgment, and wishes born of the respect due another."l3
When comparing congressional and judicial separation of power,
however, this assessment is indelicate, for it seems to indicate an
abdication not found in this governmental relationship.114 Indeed,
as was the case in Rostker, a court is able to defer without neces-
sarily yielding any wishes or opinion it might have.
The founders of this nation based "the structure of our central
107. 101 S. Ct. at 2648.
108. Id. at 2651 (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 102).
109. Id. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164
(1951) (concurring opinion).
110. See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause,
And The Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 948 (1975).
Sometimes this is not required since congressional acts are to be presumed to be
constitutional.
111. 101 S. Ct. at 2651.
112. Id.
113. WEBSTER'S NEW WoRLD DIcTONARY 370 (2d ed. 1974).
114. Justice Rehnquist made this quite clear. 101 S. Ct. at 2654.
government on the system of checks and balances. For them the
doctrine of separation of powers was not mere theory; it was a felt
necessity." 115 Fundamentally, this separation is somewhat ambig-
uous in its allotment of command. To the extent the separation is
ambiguous, it is flexible in order that it might tolerate the "inevi-
table friction" 116 drafted into the Constitution under the checks
and balances framework. Justice Holmes stated that "[tihe great
ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields
of black and white."117 It is in this ambiguity of separation of
powers that deference becomes important.
On their face, the articles of the Constitution seem clear in their
allocation of governmental power. For instance, the explicit
power granted Congress under article I, section 8118 to raise and
support armies and implement whatever laws necessary and
proper to that end is straightforward. So is the delegation to the
Supreme Court of the power to oversee all cases arising under
the Constitution as extended in article III, section 2.119 Both arti-
cles seem to strike distinct and unambiguous lines of separation
between Congress and the Supreme Court. Against a background
like Rostker, however, it becomes clear that these articles are not
disjointed, but rather substantially overlap and at times call for a
deference policy.
For the most part, whenever a citizen challenges the constitu-
tionality of a decree levied and empowered under the "congres-
sional-war-power article,"120 that citizen needs to eventually 12 1
implement the "judicial-power article."'122 A challenge of the for-
mer impacts the latter. If the judiciary upholds the congressional
decree, then there is no separation of powers conflict. However, if
the judiciary decides in favor of the citizen-challenger, any rem-
edy offered in response necessarily imposes on the congressional
command. 23 To the extent that the judicial command is repre-
115. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952), See also
Frund, Forward: The Year of the Steel Case, 66 HAxv. L. REv. 89 (1952).
116. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 240, 293 (1926).
117. 343 U.S. at 597 (quoting Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209
(1929)).
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
119. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ... " Id.
120. See note 118 supra.
121. In order to make the comparison clear, channels other than the judiciary
route open to a citizen making such a challenge are purposely excluded.
122. See note 119 supra.
123. To the extent that the power to provide for the common defense is all-en-
compassing, a judicial reprimand of a decree as being unconstitutional is indeed
an "imposition" upon congressional command when the decree was enacted under
such a power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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sentative of the people,124 there exists a constitutionally created
uncertainty as to which branch should properly125 control:126 the
Congress or the judiciary? Both branches play an equal role in
protecting and representing the people. On the one hand, the ju-
diciary plays a role of checking, balancing, and measuring the ac-
tions of Congress against the Constitution,127 being purposely
impartial and independent of any direct external influence.128 On
the other hand, Congress, purposely subject to the external influ-
ence of the citizens it represents, is carrying out its constitutional
power, which is beyond question,129 to register and conscript suffi-
cient manpower for military service.
124. See generally Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, supra note 105,
at 1097-132. See also W. MURPHY & C. PRrTCHETr, COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITCS
403 (3d ed. 1979).
125. In essence, the debate over which portion of government is to "properly"
be given the power to determine military power has at its roots the desire to avoid
at all costs the "improper" use of such a vast power. Cf. K. LASSON, YOUR RIGHTS
AND THE DRAFr 51 (1980) In the extreme:
Everyone will now be mobilized, and all boys old enough to carry a spear
will be sent to Addis Ababa. Married men will take their wives to carry
food and cook. Those without wives will take any women without a hus-
band. Anyone found at home after the receipt of this order will be
hanged-Emperor Haile Selassie.
Id.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (investigated a claim
that any judicially compelled disclosure of presidential conversations would inter-
fere with the functioning of executive branch); Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587, 593-655 (1952) (congressional ability to reprimand execu-
tive seizure); Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 127 (1926) (the scope of one
branch's power is closely related to the potential interference it may have with an-
other branch's authority). Patrick Henry, during the Virginia Convention to ratify
the same Constitution we now acknowledge as being partly ambiguous, stated
that: "I take it as the highest encomium on this country, that the acts of the legis-
lature, if unconstitutional, are liable to be opposed by the judiciary." 3 J. ELLIOT,
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTrrITToN 325 (2d ed. 1866).
127. Chief Justice Marshall called this "the very essence of judicial duty." Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803).
128. See White, The Path of American Jurisprudence, 124 U. PA. L REV. 1212,
1223 (1976). "Once Americans had decided to have a constitution with a tripartite
governmental structure... they had necessarily decided to have an independent
judiciary .... ." Id.
129. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning case).
"The constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies and make all
laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and sweeping." Id. at 377. The def-
erence due the Congressional decision to exclude women is clearer when this
quote is coupled with the Court's statement that "[iln no matter should we pay
more deference to the opinion of Congress than in its choice of instrumentalities
to perform a function that is within its power." National Mut. Insur. Co. v. Tidewa-
ter Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 603 (1949).
As applied to Rostker, this means that if the Court had chosen
to overrule the congressional refusal to amend the MSSA so as to
include women in a registration scheme, it would have been chal-
lenging the extent to which the exclusion of women is representa-
tive of the collective will. 130 If the Court was correct in deciding
that the times called for such an inclusion of females, the checks
and balances system would have served its purpose-to see to it
that any one branch did not exercise arbitrary power.13 1 If incor-
rect, the Court itself would have been guilty of an arbitrary exer-
cise of its power. Because such a mistake in assessing the
contemporary situation on the part of one branch invites no
milder an uprising than the same mistake by the other branch,
the authority to make the decision should lie with the branch
most able to avoid uprisings altogether by employing some supe-
rior ability to assess the collective sentiment of the majority of
the people.132
In the realm of the military, Congress has this superior ability.
Justice Rehnquist, quoting Gilligan v. Morgan,13 3 noted the lack
of competence on the part of the judiciary in the area of assessing
how the collective majority feels about the running of the military
facet of government:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the
courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional deci-
sions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military
force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to ci-
vilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.134
No doubt the question of which branch is to command in the
event of uncertainty has been addressed before Justice Rehnquist
commented on it. Justice Cardozo wrote: "The Constitution over-
rides a statute, but a statute, if consistent with the Constitution
overrides the law of judges. In this sense, judge-made law is sec-
130. A good definition of law that expresses how the collective will operates can
be found in the concept propounded by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant
when he stated that in his view a law conceives "[t]he sum of the circumstances
according to which the will of one may be reconciled with the will of another ac-
cording to a common rule of Freedom." R. PoUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JU-
RISPRUDENCE 65 (1943) (quoting I. KANT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1797)). See also Bo-
SANQuET, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF THE STATE 120-23, 138-43, 215-16 (3d ed. 1920).
131. Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 293. Mr. Justice Brandeis stated that
"[t]he doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of
1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.".
Id.
132. See H. BALL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWRS: CASES ON THE SEPARATION OF POW-
ERS AND FEDERALISM 202 (1980). See generally Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawles
330, 343-58 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting); Murry, Chief Justice Gibson of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Judicial Review, 32 U. Prrr. L. REV. 127 (1970)
(providing a more modern assessment).
133. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
134. Id. at 10. See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953).
[Vol. 9: 441, 1982] Rostker v. Goldberg
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
ondary and subordinate to the law that is made by legislators."135
Applying this to draft registration laws, so long as the MSSA is
"consistent" with the Constitution,13 6 it should control judge-
made law.137 In other words, as long as the MSSA is held to be a
creation of Congress within its constitutionally granted power and
is consistent with the Constitution, which extends to Congress
the power to make the rules governing such practice, 3 8 it should
not be judicially altered. Unless the Court can be convinced that
the determination by Congress to exclude women from draft re-
gistration was an exercise of arbitrary, as opposed to constituent-
based, sentiment, it should not intervene. "[L]egislatures are
[the] ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people
in quite as great a degree as courts."139
However, the license granted Congress to raise and support ar-
mies "cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to support
any exercise of congressional power which can be brought within
its ambit."'140 In terms of registration, "although the constitution
grants Congress and the President broad authority to raise and
maintain armed forces, this authority is not entirely beyond the
scope of judicial review."141 Indeed, deference without any judi-
cial review would be tantamount to abdication. Despite Justice
Rehnquist's reliance on deference, 42 the discourse and extensive
investigation the Court employed in Rostker as to the validity of
the congressional decision is anything but abdication. Deference
after such deliberation is the result, not replacement, of judicial
review. With this, no justice in Rostker takes issue.143 The repre-
135. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICLL PROCESS 14 (1921).
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
137. This, in fact, is exactly the rationale used by the first judge, in 1971, who
addressed the Rostker case. See Rowland v. Tarr, 341 F. Supp. 339, 342 (1972).
138. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cL 16.
139. B. CARDozo, supra note 135, at 90. Accord, Linde, Due Process of Lawmak-
ing, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1975).
140. Note, supra note 26, at 419.
141. T. WALKER, AMERICAN POLrrICs AND THE CONSTITUTION 191 (1978). Cf. Bar-
ret, The Rational Basis Standard for Equal Protection Review of Ordinary Legisla-
tive Classifications, 68 Ky. L. J. 845 (1980) (the proper role of the court system is
to monitor the structural and procedural limitations which the Constitution puts
on the legislative process but not to scrutinize the outcomes for their reasonable-
ness); Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial
Activism or Restraint? 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 25 (1968) (courts should avoid "chok-
ing.., the political process with the equal protection clause").
142. Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2654 (1981).
143. Id. at 2649, 2661-62. The dissenting views result from the concern over
whether the MSSA is "consistent" with the constitutional guarantees of essential
sentative accuracy of the congressional decision excluding women
from draft registration was at issue and ripe for more investiga-
tion regarding the collective sentiment 44 it supposedly repre-
sented. This was as large a request placed on the Court by the
case as was the equal protection challenge.
Herein lies a source of separation of power ambiguity between
the judiciary and congressional branches of government. As pur-
veyor of the constitutionality of legislation, the Court looks in part
to very much the same source of policy and collective social will
as does the congressional group it oversees. 145 Placing the re-
sponsibility of assessing the community will in more than one
branch so that each might correctly check and balance the other's
judgments breeds ambiguity as to which assessment is to control
in the event of a disparity in findings. This function, however, is
exactly what Justice Brandeis referred to as the designed result
of separation of powers, whose purpose is "not to avoid friction,
but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribu-
tion of the governmental powers among [branches] ,"146 to breed
such friction.
It is in this framework that the deference due Congress in
Rostker was appropriate. Deferring to Congress did not indicate
that the Court was in no position to restrain or reprimand the
congressional assessment. To be sure:
The utility of an external power restraining the legislative judgment is not
to be measured by counting the occasions of its exercise. The great ideals
of liberty and equality are preserved against the assaults of opportunism,
liberties, not from a feeling that the Court is wrong to recognize the deference due
congressional findings of military protocal. While it is generally true that "[w]e
see in legislation the more direct and accurate expression of the general will,"
sometimes we do not, and when such recognition occurs, checks and balances
render judicial review appropriate. Horack, The Common Law of Legislation, in
READING IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 503 (Cohen comp. 1951) (foot-
note omitted). Cf. I. DILLIARD, THE SPmrr OF LIBERTY-PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
LEARNED HAND 14, 15 (1960) ("The profession of the law of which [a judge] is a
part is charged with the articulation and final incidence of the successive efforts
towards justice; it must feel the circulation of the communal blood or it will wither
and drop off, a useless member").
144. See 101 S. Ct. at 2661. This is Justice White's concern when he points out,
in dissent, that "there is an indication that Congress rejected the Defense Depart-
ment's figures or relied upon an alternative set of figures." Id. He is concerned
that the collective sentiment has not been adequately assessed.
145. The development of judicial deference to public sentiment focused on
three issues. First, is the law in accordance with common custom and usage? Sec-
ond, does public sentiment favor the particular law? Third, is the law in accord
with a firm and established consensus of opinion in the civilized world? In 1910,
Mr. Justice Holmes declared that "[t]radition and the habits of the community
count for more than logic." Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358,
366 (1910). See also People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N.Y. 395, 108 N.E. 639,
(1915); WALKER, AMERICAN POLITICS & THE CONSTITUTION 1910, 190-92 (1978).
146. 272 U.S. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments,
the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general princi-
ples, by enshrining them in constitutions, and consecrating to the task of
their protection a body of defenders. By conscious or subconscious influ-
ence, the presence of this restraining power, aloof in the background, but
none the less always in reserve, tends to stabilize and rationalize the leg-
islative judgment, to infuse it with the glow of principle, to hold the stan-
dard aloft and visible for those who must run the race and keep the
faith.147
In deferring to Congress, the Court in Rostker yielded very lit-
tle. The ability of the Court to retain its separate command influ-
ence over Congress while allowing the assessment of the branch
most competent to determine that military needs prevail dictated
the Court's decision to do just that.
2. The Gender Based Classification Issue
a) Equal Protection
As just discussed, in order for the MSSA to stand up against ju-
dicial review, it must be consistent with the Constitution. That
means the gender based classification excluding women from
draft registration must not be violative of the delicate equal pro-
tection rights of men and women. Equality as defined by the con-
stitutional guarantee of equal protection,148 despite volumes of
interpretation, 149 remains to date "a formless concept." 150 Over
time, the handling of equal protection of the laws has become
known as the most "bewildering chapter"IS1 in the Supreme
Court's history.152
147. B. CARDozo, supra note 135, at 92-93.
148. Conceptually, equal protection and due process concerns are not mutually
exclusive. The fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides
in pertinent part that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although it contains no Equal
Protection Clause, as does the fourteenth amendment, the fifth amendment's Due
Process Clause prohibits the federal government from engaging in discrimination
that is so unjustifiable it becomes violative of due process. See Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
149. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); John-
son v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); James v.
Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920);
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). See also P. POLYVIOU,
THE EQUAL PROTECTON OF THE LAW 177-298 (1980).
150. Wilkinson, supra note 110, at 946.
151. Id. at 1017. See also Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segrega-
tion Decisions, 69 HARY. L. REv. (1955) (historical record).
152. We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by
way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is
Conceptually, equal protection "can hardly be taken to be a
guarantee that every law shall apply equally to every person, for
almost all legislation involves classifications placing special ...
benefits [on] individuals or groups."'1 53 The proper impetus be-
hind an equal protection challenge does not so much call for a
thorough investigation of the means employed in relation to the
ends achieved-a "standard of review analysis"15 4-as it calls for
focusing on a narrower issue included therein: the achievement
of the classification itself. As Jennings put it, equality before the
law "assumes that among equals the laws should be equal and
should be equally administered, that like should be treated
alike."155 In other words, equality before the law requires that the
"means" used to apply a law be administered equally among
those individuals similarly situated. What cannot be as easily
summed up is the narrow issue of how equals are to be classified.
The crux of this statement, the classification issue, is where one's
analysis must focus.
b) Classification in General
It is implied in the term "classification" that there exists some
distinguishing element that permits one to separate those entities
which fall into the class from those that do not. Whatever the
characteristic, there must exist a commonality of some sort by
which the classification is defined. Entities not having the charac-
teristic are separated. To the extent that this separation impacts
differently, the classification is not "equal" in the broadest sense
of the word. In fact, separate cannot be "equal."15 6 Indeed, if the
"very idea of classification [is] that of inequality,"15 7 and classifi-
cation is truly an "inescapable part of government," 58 then "the
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitu-
so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case
would be necessary for its application to any other.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall). 36 at 81 (1873). See also Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1879). Indeed, in expounding on the application
of the fourteenth amendment, the Slaughter-House Cases predicted that the Equal
Protection Clause would do no more than protect the slaves. With time, the error
in this observation becomes more and more pronounced.
153. E. BARRETr & W. COHEN, CONSTrUTIONAL LAw 583 (6th ed. 1981). See also
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973); Barrett, Judi-
cial Supervision of Legislative Classifcation&-A More Modest Role for Equal Pro-
tection? 1976 B.Y.U. L REV. 89, 90.
154. See BARRETr & W. COHEN, supra note 153, at 589-91.
155. N. JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTrruTON 50 (5th ed. 1959).
156. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Fer-
guson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (separate can be equal)).
157. P. POLYviOu, THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAws 33 (1980).
158. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AizRicAN GovEmRmENrr 59
(1976).
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tionality."'159 Those proposing equal treatment need not focus on
the inequities of inequality itself, but rather should scrutinize the
reasoning behind the "distinguishing elements" that produce the
inequality. Any other focus follows a dead-end road.
Inasmuch as they are not arbitrary,160 these "distinguishing ele-
ments" are what rightfully allow society to organize, monitor, and,
more importantly for our purposes, collectively defend itself. In
terms of draft registration then, inherent inequalities themselves
are of no moment in a constitutional challenge; rather, the focus
must be on the capriciousness of the registration of men and not
women. Justice Marshall emphatically points this out in begin-
ning his dissenting opinion. To the degree that Justice Rehnquist
expounds otherwise in the majority opinion, a quandary exists as
to whether such was in fact necessary. "The Constitution re-
quires that Congress treat similarly situated persons similarly,
not that it engage in gestures of superficial equality"161 only for
equality's sake.
c) Male Only Registration-Is It Arbitrary?
The Court expressed per curiam that "It]o withstand scrutiny
under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, 'classifications by gender must serve impor-
tant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.' "162 In discussing this height-
ened scrutiny test,163 both Justice Rehnquist and Justice Marshall
agreed that "the Government's interest in raising and supporting
armies is an 'important governmental interest,'" but differed as to
whether the "means" of discriminating between men and women
in a draft registration scheme "serves the statutory end."' 64 As
previously mentioned, this translates into a difference over
159. P. POLYVIOU, supra note 157, at 33.
160. "Arbitrary," as used here, has a great deal of relation to the true sentiment
of the collective will. That which is arbitrary confounds such a will. But see Bra-
den, The Search For Objectivity In Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L J. 571, 584-85
(1948).
161. 101 S. Ct. at 2659.
162. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977) (per curiam) (quoting Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
163. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197. Cf. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)
(depicts the "rational basis" lower scrutiny test).
164. 101 S. Ct. at 2663.
whether the "sexual" separation here is arbitrary. 165 Justice Mar-
shall feels it is. Justice Rehnquist feels it is not.
Insofar as arbitrary might mean accidental, Justice Rehnquist
clearly shows that the decision to register men and not women
was no accident. "Congress and its committees carefully consid-
ered and debated"166 the gender issue. They "did not act 'un-
thinkingly' or 'reflexively,'" but rather took notice of the
"considerable national attention and... wide ranging public de-
bate"1 67 given the issue. "The issue was considered at great
length, and Congress clearly expressed its purpose and intent"1 68
by emphatically opting for male-only draft registration. If it is
true that "[t] he less clear the intent of the legislature, the greater
freedom the court has to use its own judgment,"169 the expressly
clear intent of the legislature in the registration policy it proposed
would severely limit the propriety of the Court to substitute its
own judgment for that of the legislature.1 7 0
What is needed is a clear description of why Congress excluded
females in the registration plan it proposed.17 1 Certainly, as Jus-
tice Marshall points out, it was not because there is inherent ben-
efit in "preventing women from serving in the military....
Indeed, the successful experience of women serving in all
branches of the Armed Services would belie any such claim."
17 2
Neither can the pursuit of the "administrative convenience" 173 a
gender based classification might yield give justification to such
exclusion.174 Additionally, the exclusion of females was not done
165. If found to be "arbitrary", then equal protection has been denied. See gen-
erally 101 S. Ct. at 2655.
166. Id. at 2654. "As a member of the Armed Services Committee who has stud-
ied [the registration of women] issue with great care, I can tell my colleagues that
there is simply no military reason to draft women and therefore no reason to reg-
ister them for a possible draft." 126 CONG. REC. H2695 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1980)
(statement of Mr. Hillis).
167. 101 S. Ct. at 2655.
168. Id. at 2656.
169. M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED
STATES 477 (3d ed. 1977).
170. One author suggests this "implementation" is exactly what was the case in
Goldberg v. Rostker. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 83.
171. For one author's assessment, see Note, supra note 26, at 411.
The legislative history of the current registration law reveals that, in ad-
dition to the overall objective of maintaining an effective defense, Con-
gress intended to achieve five specific objectives by excluding women:
preventing females from participating in combat, avoiding the unneces-
sary registration of women, enhancing military flexibility, precluding the
division of the military into two separate groups, and assuring that the
draft is administratively convenient.
Id.
172. 101 S. Ct. at 2664.
173. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973).
174. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
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to keep women out of combat because that policy is protected
through other statutes that remain in force.I7 5
With this in mind, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that if registra-
tion serves no purpose 7 6 beyond providing a pool for a draft
whose only purpose is to resupply a shortage in combat arms, for
which women are not eligible, why then register females? In
other words, Justice Rehnquist was arguing that in this case men
and women are not similarly situated, and, therefore, the classifi-
cation made by Congress was not arbitrary. In fact, he cited the
existence of combat restrictions as "the basis for Congress' deci-
sion to exempt women from registration." 7 7 Granting the logic in
this reasoning, Justice Marshall stated it still was fundamentally
flawed. Marshall asserted that the government itself must demon-
strate how registering women would impede efforts to prepare for
war. Only then, he contends, will the rationale supporting the ex-
clusion of women surpass constitutional inquiry. On close inspec-
tion, however, Justice Marshall's demand on the government 78
directly parallels an "equality for equality's sake" argument,
which conflicts with what is required by the Constitution--only
that similarly situated persons be treated similarly. 79
For a classification to meet the "equality" standard of the Con-
175. 101 S. Ct. at 2666.
176. See 126 CONG. REc. H272048-47 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1980). Mr. Conte said the
purpose of registration as now proposed was "to get large numbers of men into the
military sooner." Id. at 2706. See also Note, supra note 26, at 415; note 125 supra,
at 21; Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 552 (1944); United States v. Nugent, 346
U.S. 1, 9 (1953).
177. 101 S. Ct. at 2658.
178. There was a conflict as to who has the burden of proof. In Rostker, Justice
Marshall said the party "defending" the classification has the burden of proof. See
101 S. Ct. at 2663. Contra, United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 101 S. Ct. 453,
464 (1980) (Brennan, J. dissenting: "the burden rests on those challenging a legis-
lative classification. . . ." Marshall, J., joined in the dissent).
179. See generally Michael M. v. Superior Court, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981), which
states that a legislature may provide for the special problems of women without
offending the Equal Protection Clause.
In addition, it was argued in Rostker that the reason why Congress excluded fe-
males in its registration scheme was that if females were drafted, resulting
problems would impair military flexibility. Though somewhat speculative, it was
envisioned that women, being legally and morally of limited utility under contin-
gency conditions, might end up in support base locations at some time in the war
effort and eliminate an option a commander might otherwise have to puUl forward
such support forces. But for the sex of these support forces, the commander's po-
sition might not be considered precarious. No doubt, should such a self-imposed
hinderance to the success of a war manuever occur, it would be detrimental to
every one concerned in the war effort. Free rotation of personnel is beyond a
stitution it "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike."180 With this test in mind, the
words of the congressmen who themselves voted for the exclusion
of women might be the best source to get at the reasoning behind
such a decision.
No doubt it is a formidable task to decipher a lone rationale be-
hind a congressional choice, and perhaps it is accurate to say that
one never exists. It could be that after all the argument and de-
bate, congressmen voted instinctively, in response to any number
of influences, when they chose to exclude women from the regis-
tration program. If this was the case, it could even be argued that
to the extent these instinctive votes represented the collective
will of the "people," the resulting exclusion was not arbitrary at
all.181 Nonetheless, the debates in committee and hearings in-
volved in the inquiry at hand do provide at least one concrete and
satisfying rationale.
No doubt "the Selective Service Act is precisely that -selective
service. "182 It proves to be the initial exposure for non-voluntary
military personnel to a military operation wrought with selective
policies. The selective practices at this the initial level of military
service are only the beginning of the spectrum permitted the
military.183
By not allowing women in the military to enter combat, the
Armed Forces openly espouse a policy tantamount to "it's not a
women's place."'184 Such a practice, though possibly histori-
mere administrative convenience; it is a legitimate concern, held by Justice Rehn-
quist to be most significant. 101 S. Ct. at 2660.
With this, Justice Marshall took no exception. instead, he attacked the argu-
ment's relevance to including women in a registration plan. Justice Marshall
stated that if induction of a limited number of female draftees were the rule, the
inclusion of women would no "more divide the military into 'permanent combat'
and 'permanent support' groups than is presently the case with the All-Volunteer
Armed Forces." 101 S. Ct. at 2673. However, in suggesting that Congress amend
section 5(a) (1) of the MSSA so as to authorize differential induction of men and
women, Justice Marshall advised Congress to create a plan perhaps conceptually
more violative of essential liberties than the exclusionary plan he now scorns.
180. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano & Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
181. See note 160 supra.
182. H. POLLACK & A. SMrrIH, Cw,L LIBERTIES & CivL RIGHTs IN THE UNrrED
STATES 206 (1978) (emphasis added).
183. This "permission" is relatively unique. See E. CARY, WOMEN AND THE LAw
92 (1977).
184. See Brown, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for
Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 970 (1971). Hale & Kanowitz, Women
and the Draft: A Response to Critics of the Equal Rights Amendment, 23 HASTINGS
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callyl85 and morally appropriate, "keeps women from . . .com-
mand positions and is a crucial factor in promotion and
advancement" in the military hierarchy. 186 In short, "[w]omen
who ... volunteer for the armed forces find no equality of oppor-
tunity in the work place."187 Furthermore, "[mlilitary women
have also been excluded from flying and other 'combat special-
ties' that are often prerequisites for the best assignments and ad-
vancement to the highest levels in the armed forces." 188
Schlesinger v. Ballard'89 established no less. As Justice Rehn-
quist stated in retrospect: "In light of the combat restrictions, wo-
men did not have the same opportunities for promotion as men
.... ,,190 It is well recognized today that the situation still exists,
and that, at least in the short-term, women who would have the
military thrust upon them, via the draft, could expect to find
things no different. Therefore, in order to prevent the forced in-
clusion of women into such a system, Congress elected not to reg-
ister them. Certainly the equal protection fundamentals in such a
policy, in view of the treatment women now get in the military,
extend past benign purpose'91 and, in fact, suggest exclusionary
practice. As the Court has stated, "a legislature may provide for
the special problems of a woman." 192
It was in recognition of these factors that Senator Warner, a
member of the Senate's Armed Services Committee's Subcom-
mittee on Manpower and Personnel, submitted a rationale for ex-
cluding women from draft registration. 93 In drawing a distinction
L.J. 199, 212-14 (1971). See generally P. KARSTEN, LAW, SOLDIERS, AND COMBAT
(1978).
185. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 36 n.3.
186. M. DELSMAN, EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW ABoUT ERA 229 (1973).
Delsman discusses the Air Force excluding women from serving as pilots or
navigators.
187. Id. at 243.
188. Id. at 8.
189. 419 U.S. 498 (1975). A law mandating that any lieutenant in the U.S. Navy
or captain in the U.S. Marine Corp who is twice passed over for promotion shall
be honorably discharged was held not to be violative of the concept of equal pro-
tection implied by the fifth amendment Due Process Clause despite its failure to
apply to women officers. Id.
190. 101 S Ct. at 2653.
191. See Wright, supra note 141.
192. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975). See generally Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). This was one of the first cases to consider the consti-
tutional position of women at length, although the Court did not consider the ap-
plication of women's rights to the Equal Protection Clause to be at issue.
193. See 126 CONG. REc. S6527-49 (daily ed. June 10, 1980).
between a volunteer who thrusts herself into the military hierar-
chy and a woman who is required to register, Senator Warner
said:
I think it is very unfair to a woman to place her involuntarily in a system
which [recognizably] has discriminatory practices .... [Fjorcing her in-
voluntarily into that system where she will be confronted against her will
with discriminatory practices [such as] not be [ing] permitted to have the
same job opportunties as the man with whom she trains [is not
acceptable].194
In addressing the other side of the inequities involved, Senator
Warner went on to predict an influx of claims by men in the mili-
tary "saying that [they are] being forced into combat unfairly
while women are exempted. ... 195 The difficulty the govern-
ment would have in resolving these challenges would be great, as
is today evidenced by the refusal of fellow Senators to address
Senator Warner's claims.
If lawsuits alone would not create enough of a problem by in-
ducting women in large quantities into the armed services, the ef-
fect on morale might provide the extra impetus for opting to
exclude women from a draft registration scheme. As J. Fred
Buzhardt, the General Counsel for the Defense Department wrote
to Senator Birch Bayh back in 1972:
There is the possibility that assigning men and women together in the
field in direct combat roles might adversely affect the efficiency and disci-
pline of our forces. On the other hand, if women were not assigned to
duty in the field, overseas, or on board ships, but were [nonetheless] en-
tering the armed forces in large numbers, this might result in a dispropor-
tionate number of men serving more time in the field and on board ship
because of a reduced number of positions available for their
reassignment. 196
In other words, morale is hurt if women in large numbers occupy
a disproportionate number of the "soft" jobs under an induction
scheme purposely modified to promote equal treatment among
similarly situated persons. If women are included in the draft re-
gistration system and subsequently are drafted, how will the gov-
ernment demonstrate that anything but a fifty-fifty induction ratio
is not arbitrary? Even if somehow rationalized on that level, how
will the subsequent "ratio," of men to women, of 100 to 0 in com-
bat assignments be justified? Every male called up that exceeds
in number the females called up and vice versa, plus every male
soldier assigned a combat role, depicts a potential plaintiff in a
suit challenging the capriciousness of such policies. Yet, a fifty-
194. Id. at 56535.
195. Id. at S6530.
196. M. DELSMAN, supra note 186, at 230-31. See also P. KARSTEN, LAw,
SOLDIERS, AND COMBAT 62 (1978) ("Soldiers about to fight have fears that can be
reduced or controlled if they are satisfied that they and their comrades are at least
as tough, 'mean,' deadly, and capable as the enemy.")
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fifty conscription policy would "create monumental strains on the
training system, would clog the personnel administration and
support systems needlessly, and would impede our national de-
fense preparations [possibly] at a time of great national need."197
Furthermore, a policy demanding an equal number of women in
combat roles is unacceptable altogether.198 In supporting the
challenge by the plaintiff in Rostker, Justice Marshall might leave
himself no other alternative than to one day support these other
challenges as well. If one line of classification differentiating be-
tween men and women in the military is to be held vulnerable to
constitutional challenge, how is it that others drawn elsewhere
are not?
Inasmuch as it can be said that the object of the legislation
challenged in Rostker was to sidestep the vast equal protection is-
sues of forced female submission to a male-oriented military sys-
tem, the question as to why Congress excluded women in a
registration scheme might be answered. As Justice Rehnquist ar-
gued, the purpose of registration is to provide a pool for the draft-
ing of combat troops. Because only men are eligible for combat
positions, men and women are not similarly situated. Drawing
the inevitable gender classification line at registration instead of
later at combat contributes to the goal' 99 of preventing similarly
situated inductees from being treated differently as well as head-
ing off lawsuits which would undoubtedly result. The MSSA pre-
vents this unequal treatment by excluding women from the
discriminatory, albeit necessary,200 practices of the military. Only
those women who enlist of their own free will will be exposed to
those practices. These reasons certainly illustrate that the male-
only classification and the congressional decision regarding it
were anything but arbitrary. The checklist for the constitutional-
ity of a classification is therefore complete. Until the roads of gen-
der inequality inside the military are torn up and repaved, the
197. 101 S. Ct. at 2674 quoting Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Authorizing
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981for Military Procuremen; Research and Devel-
opment, Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Civil De-
fense, and for Other Purposes, S. REP. No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 159, reprinted
in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2612, 2649.
198. See generally P. BOUNE, MEN, STRESS, & VIETNM (1970); Equal Rights for
Men and Womer4 1971: Hearings on H. J. Res. 35, 208 and Related Bil4 and H.R. 916
and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judici-
ary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 303-04 (1971), at 164.
199. See Barrett, supra note 153, at 92.
200. But see M. DELsmAN, supra note 186, at 229-30.
proponents of equal treatment must recognize why their road
comes to a dead end where civilian and military worlds begin to
meet; it has no place else to go.
B. Future Impact of Rostker
It may be that one day the discourse of the Court in Rostker
will be held in the same regard as is the "Slaughterhouse"20 1 pre-
diction as to the future place of the Equal Protection Clause. But,
before this comes about, a change is necessary in the collective
will and its representative Congress as to the role women are to
play in the military.202 Though such a transformation has begun,
as Rostker shows us, it is not complete.
"It [Rostker] is substantially different from recent gender-based
discrimination cases, in that it does not involve the exclusion of
women from military service, [a concept surpassed by today's so-
ciety] but rather ther [sic] exclusion from compulsory service
.. ".."203 A paramount worth lies in the case's reassurance that
the congressional refusal to jetison past precedent defines the
limit (at the instant of Rostker) beyond which our society has yet
to venture.
It could be that the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA) 204 will spell the end of Rostker. No doubt it is a movement
in the transformation of the collective will towards equal treat-
ment of all citizens that ventures beyond any "limit," saying, in
short, that "sex is a prohibited classification."205 To achieve the
objectives of the amendment206 only an "unequivocal ban against
201. See note 152 supra.
202. It took a similar shift, indeed a civil war, to emancipate the role of Blacks
in our society. After the Civil War, there was a further shift which was partially
brought about by a judicial recognition of "racial antagonism" as being the design
behind certain classifications. As such, Justice Black referred to them as per se
violative of the Constitution. Antagonism can never justify a classification. Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Perhaps the inability of equal
treatment proponents to find "sexual antagonism" in the classification of those eli-
gible to register undermines their effort's worth. Do efforts that in good faith "ac-
commodate" women sexually "antagonize" men? See H. POLLACK & A. SMrrH,
supra note 182, at 207, 263-69.
203. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 93 (emphasis added).
204. The proposed equal rights amendment reads as follows:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (proposed).
205. Brown, supra note 184, at 889 (emphasis added).
206. Id. at 892. No doubt, then, statutes like the MSSA would fall along with
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taking sex into account" will suffice. Militarily, "[t]here is little
doubt that if the Equal Rights Amendment becomes law, men and
women will be equally subject to compulsory military service
S. .. ,"207 the same forced inclusion that Rostker denies. Time will
tell which of these contrasting viewpoints best pursues the ideals
of our Constitution. Today, Rostker complies best, but, "[s] ooner
or later, if the demands of social utility are sufficiently urgent, if
the operation of an existing rule is sufficiently productive of hard-
ship... utility will tend to triumph." 08
Society must continue to scrutinize the utility of Rostker. Each
citizen time and again must decide whether a military limit on the
further progress of the equal treatment effort pursues important
collective interests. Until the advent of a collective desire to do
otherwise, possibly endowed in a ratified ERA, Rostker's future is
secure.
Back in 1971, the Assistant Attorney General predicted "that if
[the] ERA were ratified Congress would probably have to either
draft both men and women on the same basis or draft no one. '20 9
To the extent this official remains of this opinion, it is unlikely
that Rostker will coexist with a ratified ERA because he now sits
on the Supreme Court's "cutting edge," conceivably in the pre-
mier position to decide. The opinion of the majority in Rostker
was his own.2 10
C. Conclusion
It is obvious that Congress made a conscious policy choice,
within its constitutional authority, to not register women. When
this was judicially challenged, a healthy ambiguity born of the
separation of powers arose. Responding the the deference ac-
corded Congress in assessing military matters, the Court's major-
ity reaffirmed the wisdom of the decision tendered by those called
upon in the Constitution to make it. Despite the majority's assur-
ance that abdication had no place in this deference, 2 11 the Court's
Rostker under the ERA. A drastic restructuring of societal laws would be
apposite.
207. R. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE EQUAL EIGHTs AMENDMENT 55 (1980).
208. B. Cardozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 117 (1924).
209. M. DELsMAN, supra note 186, at 227.
210. For an excellent brief discussion of Justice Rehnquist's ten years on the
Supreme Court, see L.A. Times, Sept 6, 1981, at 1, col 1.
211. 101 S. Ct. at 2653.
dissent viewed this reaffirmation as a glaring dodge of the judicial
responsibility of "safeguarding essential liberties." 21 2
No doubt merit is to be found in the decision. Such exclusion of
women prevented the Court from finding itself in the precarious
situation of forcefully subjecting women to a discriminatory mili-
tary world over which it has limited power. It was proper for the
Court to defer such a decision to the branch with such control-a
branch which evidentally appreciates the vast equal protection
hotbox suggested by the combination of a decidedly permissible
sexually discriminatory military and compelled female subservi-
ence thereto.
V. ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ROSTKER DECISION
A. The Majority Applies a Deferential Standard
Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion, declaring that
the MSSA did not violate the fifth amendment equal protection
guarantee by authorizing the President to require a male-only
draft registration. The Court began by stating that Congress had
devoted a great deal of attention to reviewing the constitutionality
of the MSSA. Furthermore, the Court had traditionally allowed
Congress a considerable amount of leeway in legislative decisions
involving military affairs.2 13 The majority cited United States v.
O'Brien2 14 as authority to illustrate the deference given by the
Court to Congress regarding military matters. This appeared to
be an excuse for a lesser degree of scrutiny of congressional ac-
tions than the Court had applied since Craig v. Boren.215 By cit-
ing O'Brien, which came well before the new "important
governmental interest" test, the majority seemed to be reaching
back in time to justify its decision.2 16 "In such a case, we cannot
212. Id. at 2664.
213. Id. at 2651. This analysis by the Court aligns closely with what is charac-
terized as the lowest level review, the "rational basis" test. Extreme deference is
given to the legislature and the Court looks at the classification only to determine
if there is a conceivable rational basis upon which the legislature could have relied
on to promulgate the law. See notes 36 & 37 supra. Such a test is basically tooth-
less in that it neither delves into the legislature's purpose in enacting such a law,
nor requires that the legislation be substantially related to an important govern-
mental interest. Simply, the "rational basis" test requires that the classification be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. See text accompanying
note 37 supra. While the majority purported to apply the "important governmen-
tal interest" test from Craig, in substance it appears as if Justice Rehnquist ap-
plied a "rational basis" test while still calling it an "important governmental
interest" test. See 101 S. Ct. at 2654; see also note 74 supra.
214. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
215. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See notes 71-76 supra and accompanying text.
216. The O'Brien case was decided by the Warren Court in 1968, while the
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ignore Congress' broad authority conferred by the Constitution to
raise and support armies when we are urged to declare unconsti-
tutional its studied choice of one alternative in preference to an-
other for furthering that goal."217
The majority also believed that, in the area of military affairs,
the courts were not competent, thus indicating an intention to
give even more deference to Congress. As authority for this def-
erential concept, the majority cited cases which dealt with inter-
nal military affairs,2 18 cases that did not touch on civilian rights,
Craig test was not even formulated until 1976. See note 129 supra. The facts in
O'Brien involved several young men facing criminal prosecution for burning their
draft cards. Cf. Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (gender classifi-
cation demands "exceedingly persuasive justification").
217. 101 S. Ct. at 2655. Although the Court gave a large degree of deference to
what it has termed a "studied choice" of Congress, it is questionable whether Con
gress really made its decision based on the evidence brought forth by military offi-
cials and others testifying on the efficacy of women in the military. See notes 243,
247, 249 & 273 infra. Part of the Craig test requires that the Court look to the evi-
dence supporting the Congressional decision to determine if the legislation is
based upon that evidence. 429 U.S. at 197-98. From Congressional testimony, it ap-
pears that the statistics on women in the military and the testimony of military
experts fell on deaf ears. For example, note the comments of distinguished Sena-
tor Sam Nunn, Member of the Committee on Armed Services:
You can talk all you want to about theoretical rights, but this adminis-
tration is not dealing with reality. You are not confronting the difficult
uestions in peacetime; therefore, we are going to have to confront the dif-
cult questions in wartime if we have it. Andwe are going to have pure,
absolute bedlam in this society.
You are going to be drafting women, not putting them in combat, but
putting them in the military service and perhaps leaving their husbands at
home to take care of the children. Anyone who thinks this society is pre-
pared for that kind of shock is either operating in a different environment
that I am or in a dream world.
Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year, 1981-
Part 3, Manpower and Personnel: Hearings on S.2294 Before the Senate Comm. on
Armed Services, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 1691-92 (1980) (statement of Senator Nunn).
One writer stated:
The subject of women and war is an emotional one that evokes immedi-
ate and strong responses, based largely on ancient and deeply held beliefs
[and] .. .still blind[s] military planners and public officials to the damage
done by the exclusion of women from a full role in the military affairs of
the nation.
Goodman, infra note 270, at 243.
218. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976). The plaintiffs were charged
with unauthorized absences from the military. They were brought before their
commanding officer for a hearing and punishment without counsel. This was
deemed constitutional because of the policy of deference to Congress in the con-
ducting of internal military affairs. Id. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). In
Greer, candidates attempting to speak on a military post were banned from doing
so. The Court held that first and fifth amendment rights were not infringed upon
because a military post is for the exclusive use of training soldiers, and is not to
as does the issue of draft registration.
In a factually unjustified step, the majority distinguished
Rostker from the precedent established in Reed 21 9 and Fron-
tiero,220 that overly broad gender based classifications would not
be upheld, and claimed to follow the lead of Schlesinger.221
Schlesinger discriminated between men and women on the basis
that they were not similarly situated due to the exclusion of wo-
men from combat roles. Based on that decision, the majority in
Rostker said that excluding women from draft registration was
not grounded on generalizations about male and female roles, 2 22
but rather that there were other substantial reasons for the exclu-
sion. Therefore, by applying Schlesinger's holding to a different
set of facts, the majority justified Congress' male-only draft regis-
tration. Congress equated registration with induction, reasoning
that the one ultimately led to the other.223 This made the poten-
tial position of military inductees of prime importance.224
Even though the parties in Rostker attempted to label the legis-
lation either "gender based" or "military,"225 the majority de-
nied 226 that labels would guide the justices to the proper decision.
Although the majority used strong language to disclaim the cate-
gorization of the legislation as one or the other, it appeared that
the majority accommodated the Government by giving it the "mil-
serve as a public forum for political debate as are public streets and arenas. Id.
In Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), the Court held that Congress has wider au-
thority to draft broad laws and standards in the military sphere which would
otherwise be struck down as unconstitutional if applied in civilian society.
All these cases dealt with internal military functions. They can be factually dis-
tinguished from the case of registration, in that registration involves the rights and
liabilities of civilians, not those of military personnel.
219. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
220. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
221. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
222. 101 S. Ct. at 2652.
223. Id. at 2653. Under the MSSA, two separate grants of authorization are re-
quired to draft civilians into the military. The first grant of power authorizes the
registration of eligible civilians to register with the Selective Service. The second
authorization of power is to induct registrants into the military. Section three of
the MSSA gives the President power by proclamation to order registration. How-
ever, there is no current authority to induct civilians into the military. This au-
thorization expired in 1975 and would need legislation by Congress to be revived.
Id. at 2649.
224. However, the military testimony alerted Congress to a substantial need for
male and female inductees. Females, not allowed to fill combat positions, are cur-
rently sought after in the All Volunteer Force and have been historically short in
numbers at actual mobilization. Thus, even if Congress wants to equate registra-
tion with induction, a logically unsound connection, there is still a substantial
need for women inductees in the military. See notes 236, 243, & 252 inrfa.
225. 101 S. Ct. at 2654.
226. Id.
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itary" label and the subsequent deferential result.227
The majority then turned to the application of the "important
governmental interest" test, which left no doubt that raising an
army was an important governmental objective.228 But with re-
gard to whether the exclusion of women from draft registration
was substantially related to that governmental objective, the ma-
jority reviewed the conclusions of Congress on the subject of wo-
men in the military. The majority failed to find it necessary to
delve into the original intentions of Congress when it enacted the
MSSA in 1948.229 Because Congress had prepared a reevaluation
of the legislative history of the MSSA in 1980, the majority treated
these findings as the relevant legislative history.230
In summarizing, the majority said231 that the legislation must
be examined in light of the registration leading to a draft, and that
a draft would primarily be used to obtain combat troops. There-
fore, the purpose of the registration was to create a pool for draft-
ing combat troops. Because Congress has refused to authorize
the use of women in combat, the majority validated the legislation
excluding women from draft registration.
But, even if women as a group do not participate in combat po-
sitions, the majority allowed broad legislation, based on gender
discrimination, to pass before it without conducting a proper ex-
amination of the real purposes behind such legislation as re-
quired by the "important governmental interest" test.232 The
majority did not address the issue of a benign benefit or favorit-
ism for women which is being espoused in the MSSA. Nor did it
consider the issue of discrimination against men. Dismissing the
facts that surround women's current role in society and the mili-
tary, the majority concluded that Congress had evaluated the "ne-
227. Id. at 2655; see aLso note 217 supra.
228. 101 S. Ct. at 2654.
229. Id. at 2656. This aspect of the Court's deference to Congress again illus-
trates the watered-down application of the Craig test which Rehnquist purported
to apply. The Court looked only at the conclusions of Congress and not at the evi-
dence presented. Inspection of the evidence is an integral component of the "im-
portant governmental interest" test. The absence of examination into the reasons
behind the legislation is the same as the lowest level of scrutiny of the "rational
basis" test, which the Court has acknowledged as improper in sex-discrimination
cases since 1971 in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197-98 (1976); see also text accompanying notes 74 & 75 supra.
230. 101 S. Ct. at 2656.
231. Id. at 2658-60.
232. 429 U.S. at 192.
cessity" and not the "equity" of registering women.233 The
majority claimed that even if a small number of women were
drafted in an emergency, it would not be worth the extra burden
to include them in the MSSA registration process. 234 Thus, the
district court was found to have erred in evaluating the evidence
rather than adopting Congress's conclusions on the subject.
B. The Succinct Minority Opinion of Justice White
Attacking the majority's interpretations of Congress' conclu-
sions, Justice White pointed out that noncombat positions are
open to women in peacetime as well as during mobilization. The
conclusion that all noncombat positions could be filled by volun-
teers "should not be ascribed to Congress, particularly in the face
of the testimony of military authorities .... ,,235 The record did
not appear to support the contention that all 80,000 noncombat po-
sitions open to women could be filled by volunteers. 236 This was a
critical issue for Justice White, who admitted 237 that if there were
some support for the statement that 80,000 women volunteers
would come forth, he would have joined the majority.
Justice White agreed that in the event of a mobilization, if the
percentage of women able to serve in noncombat positions was
minimal, administrative convenience would have justified the de-
cision not to register them. However, the number of women that
can be used is neither "small or insubstantial, and administrative
convenience has not been sufficient justification for the kind of
outright gender-based discrimination"2 = which is involved here.
Thus, Justice White calls239 for the justification of legislative
purpose by empirical evidence, while recognizing that the Court
should have applied its "middle tier" test rather than abdicating
to the wishes of congressional administrative convenience.
233. 101 S. Ct. at 2659. The crux of the issue in this case is not "necessity" but
"equity," contrary to the declaration of Congress. What is at stake is equal protec-
tion under the law concerning registration requirements as they relate to the
equal treatment of men and women. Whether there is a necessity to use female
personnel in combat is not important. In the application of the "important govern-
mental interest" test, the legislature must show that not registering women is sub-
stantially related to important governmental interests. 101 S. Ct. at 2663 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
234. 101 S. Ct. at 2660.
235. 101 S. Ct. at 2661 (White, J., dissenting).
236. During the 1950's, an attempt was made to recruit roughly 100,000 women
to meet the demands of the Korean War. This effort was doomed from the begin-
ning, because the war was unpopular. The women recruited never reached the
number authorized. M. Bmnm & J. BACH, WOMEN AND THE MLrrARY 12 (1977).
237. 101 S. Ct. at 2661 (White, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 2662.
239. Id.
[Vol. 9: 441, 1982] Rostker v. Goldberg
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
C. Justice Marshall Takes a Strong Objection
Justice Marshall set out the issue in the case by delineating the
difference between registration and a draft. He concluded that
the latter was not of importance in this case. "[WIe are not asked
to rule on the constitutionality of a statute governing conscrip-
tion."240 The issue was one of gender discrimination, which was
properly governed by developing precedents and application of
the "important governmental interest" test. Conceding, as the
majority did, that the first part of the test was met, Justice Mar-
shall approached the issue of whether the discriminating meas-
ures employed by the MSSA substantially serve the statute's
purpose.241 He concluded that they did not, stating "that even in
the area of military affairs, deference to congressional judgments
cannot be allowed to shade into an abdication of this Court's ulti-
mate responsibility to decide constitutional questions."242 Justice
Marshall, by following Craig more closely than the majority, did
not see the validity in the majority's deferential stance.
In looking at Congress' rationalization for excluding women
from draft registration, Justice Marshall found the connection be-
tween registration and conscription made by the Senate Armed
Services Committee243 irrelevant to the issue of registration. Pre-
cluding women from combat roles was the major finding of the
Committee, and, as such, it does not affect the decision to register
women because statutes 2" already exist to exempt women from
combat roles even if they do register. Justice Marshall attacked
the logic of the majority and argued that the Court had improp-
erly applied Craig.245 Justice Marshall applied the test, placing
240. Id. at 2662 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also notes 223 & 224 supra.
241. 101 S. Ct. at 2663 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "[B]ut the question remains
whether the discriminatory means employed itself substantially serves the statu-
tory end".
242. Id. at 2663-64.
243. "The policy precluding the use of women in combat is.. .the most impor-
tant reason for not including women in a registration system." Hearings on the
Fiscal Year 1981 Defense Authorization BilL S. Rep. No. 96-826 Before the Senate
Armed Services Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 157 (1980) [hereinafter Senate Hear-
ings 1. The facts contradict this conclusion: in the last draft less than one percent
of those inducted actually served in combat units. 118 CONG. REC. 4390 (1972).
244. See Armed Forces Act, 10 U.S.C. § 101, 6015, 8549 (1976). Air Force and
Navy women may not be assigned to combat positions or vessels. The Army and
Marines have a similar policy although not in statutory form.
245. 101 S. Ct. at 2666 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall correctly
placed the burden on the government to show that a gender-neutral registration
the burden on the Government of showing that an important gov-
ernmental interest would be advanced by excluding women from
draft registration, rather than placing the burden on the plaintiff-
respondents to show that a gender-neutral classification would
substantially advance important governmental interests. Under
Justice Marshall's application of the Craig test, the Government
did not show that the discriminatory regulation advanced govern-
mental interests. 246
Justice Marshall supported his conclusion by reviewing the evi-
dence presented to Congress; he did not simply cite its conclu-
sions. He found that many of the eventual draftees would be
needed to fill a variety of noncombat positions,247 with no combat
eligibility necessary. Not every man is eligible for combat, yet all
are required to register.248 Furthermore, Justice Marshall pointed
out that the Department of Defense found no reason for refusing
to register women,249 and that women are not ineligible for all po-
sitions in the event of a draft.250
Additionally, Justice Marshall attacked what the majority called
"equity" and relabled it "nothing less than the Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws which 'requires
that Congress treat similarly situated persons similarly.' "251 To
Justice Marshall, men and women both eligible to serve in vari-
ous capacities 25 2 within the military, are similarly situated and
procedure would significantly impede the efforts to prepare for the draft. See note
229 supraI accord, note 249 itfra.
246. 101 S. Ct. at 2667.
247. Reinstitution of Procedures For Registration Under the Military Selective
Service Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel of the Sen-
ate Armed Services Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1390, 1395-96, 1665 (1980) [herein-
after cited as Senate Hearings II] (statements of Principal Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of the Army, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Defense, and Gen-
eral Yerks).
248. Due to a different policy that classifies registrants on their eligibility for
placement in military positions, including combat positions, there will be a sub-
stantial number of men who cannot be placed in combat. Several deferments such
as for physical defects, conscientious objector status, and religious affiliation,
would rule out a proportion of men from eligibility for combat; yet Congress will
require them to register anyway. Military Selection Services Act, 50 U.S.C. § 451
app. (1976). See also 101 S. Ct. at 2667 n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
249. "Our conclusion is that there are good reasons for registering [women].
Our conclusion is even more strongly that there are not good reasons for refusing
to register them." Senate Hearings H, supra note 247, at 1667-68 (Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Danzig).
250. 101 S. Ct. at 2669.
251. Id. at 2671.
252. Currently, over 150,000 women are serving in the all volunteer force. It is
expected that this number will swell to 250,000 in 1985. See Note, supra note 26, at
412. Out of a total of 567,000 jobs for enlisted personnel, women are eligible for
306,000. In addition, all branches have planned for the increase in the number of
women currently serving. M. Bmim & J. BACH, supra note 236, at 27.
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cannot be discriminated against on the basis of sex.253 Acknowl-
edging that the draft of large numbers of women might impede
the mobilization of the military, Justice Marshall concluded that
Congress may induct an appropriate number of men and women,
thereby achieving greater flexibility than if only men were eligible
to be drafted. With such a result, the Constitution would not have
to make way for this gender-discriminatory legislation.
Justices Marshall, White, and Brennan did not prevail in their
view of which way the Court should turn in analysis of equal pro-
tection challenges. Nor did their observations on the important
role of women in the military succeed. Instead, the majority view
by Justice Rehnquist is now law.
D. The Impact of Rostker
1. A Blow to an Advancing Equal Protection Doctrine
The Court's decision in Rostker has ramifications not only in
courts of law but in the everyday lives of women throughout the
United States. Turning first to the courts, the decision can be
characterized as a step backward in the evolution of the Equal
Protection Doctrine. Admittedly, the Burger Court started with
very little in the way of a test specifically designed to aid in deci-
sions involving gender based discrimination.254 However, before
1976, when the Court articulated the Craig test, the Court seemed
to be taking definite strides255 towards ensuring that the Equal
Protection Clause would be viable for men and women alike. The
Court had definitely progressed from the view that the only provi-
sion thought to deal with equal protection for women was the
nineteenth amendment.256
After Craig, the Court seemed more willing to look beyond the
stated legislative purpose to determine what the actual intent of
253. As in the cases leading to the present, the Court characterized the double-
edged effect of discrimination. Women supposedly favored here by not having to
register, are actually being denied the economic and social benefits which flow
from serving in the military. Alternatively, men are forced to bear the burden of
national defense when it is a task to be shared by all citizens. See, e.g., Wein-
berger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
254. See text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.
255. See text accompanying notes 47, 51, 58 & 60 supra.
256. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (women's rights stem from the nine-
teenth amendment and that for women the rest of the Constitution is an empty
box).
the legislation was. 25 7 The Craig test was accepted as a solution
to the polarity of the "two-tiered" test inherited from the Warren
Court. The Court consistently used the "important governmental
interest" test from Craig, developing a suspicion of sex
classifications.258
When the Court faced Rostker, its policies on sex classification
were certainly not finalized. The Court turned away from the
strict application of the "important governmental interest" test as
it had been used in the past.259 Justice Rehnquist applied the
Craig test with a new deference twist culled from a pre-Craig de-
cision.260 Thus, the enlightened view of gender discrimination ap-
pears to have come to a halt in 1981.
Several questions remain unanswered by the Court's decision
in Rostker. It is safe to assume that the Craig test remains a via-
ble tool in examining the constitutionality of gender based stat-
utes. However, it is not at all clear how the deference aspect of
the Rostker decision will be applied in the future.
The Court based its deference on the delegation of power to
Congress by the Constitution.261 But, as Justice Marshall pointed
out, the Court also has a constitutional duty to interpret the
supreme law of the land.262 It is possible that the deference exer-
cised in Rostker will be confined to military matters. Language
was specific enough in the majority opinion to indicate that the
area of military decision and regulation is in a category by it-
self.263 Past Court decisions 264 involving non-military legislation
257. "Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the
basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper
place' of women and their need for special protection." Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283
(1979). See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (social security provision
causing widowers but not widows to prove dependence on deceased spouse was
invalidated because it was based on societal stereotypes); Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313 (1977) (remedial purpose behind social security benefits being greater for
women upheld).
258. Id. See also Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (eight
to one, the court decided that gender classifications based on societal stereotypes
are not true in many cases and a case-by-case determination is more appropriate).
259. See note 213 supra.
260. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (criminal prosecution of draft-
card burning, decided well before the advent of the "important governmental in-
terest" test). More recently, however, lower courts have not found the need to de-
fer to Congress in external military affairs.
261. See note 5 supra.
262. 101 S. Ct. at 2676 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
263. "The operation of a healthy deference to legislative and executive judg-
ments in the area of military affairs is evident. . . ." Id. at 2652 (emphasis ad-
ded). "[B] ut the tests and limitations to be applied may differ because of the mili-
tary context." Id. at 2653 (emphasis added). Thus, Roskter, by its language, will
be limited in its application of a deferential standard to military contexts.
264. See generally note 3 supra.
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will stand as persuasive authority to strike down gender based
discrimination through the Craig test in the future. Indeed, the
Court seemed very careful to apply the Craig test in a methodical
manner. This would indicate a willingness by the Court to retain
the test in its original form, but apply a very strict deferential
standard when dealing with military affairs.
Another significant aspect of the Rostker decision is contained
in the majority's hesitation to look beyond legislative conclu-
sions 265 and delve into the empirical evidence which either sup-
ports or invalidates the legislation's purpose. The precedent set
in Craig, and followed in later cases, 266 seemed to express an in-
terest by the Court in carefully examining the purposes as well as
the effects of legislation before making any decisions about its va-
lidity, thus distinguishing it from the "rational basis" level of re-
view. Rostker did not support the past enthusiasm of the Court in
this area. The Court seemed satisfied to take the conclusion of
congressional hearings and adopt them without further explora-
tion into the soundness of those conclusions. 267
However, because the case dealt with a military issue, the lack
of independent investigation by the Court to support the legisla-
tion's purpose can be attributed to the deferential standard ap-
plied.268 Assuming this to be the case, it is likely that the Court,
in other than a military context, will once again apply the Craig
test with the concurrent searching of legislative purpose. Appar-
ently, when it comes to military matters, the Court has deter-
mined that equal protection must give way to the mobilization of
manpower.2 69
265. See note 213 supra. In the majority opinion, Senate and House report con-
clusions were cited as well as the conclusions of several Senators. The Court did
not look at the evidence here as it did in Craig. The Craig Court examined evi-
dence outside the legislative history of the statute; in Roskter the Court said that
the "legislative history is. . .highly relevant in assessing the constitutional validity
of the exemption." 101 S. Ct. at 2656. But see text accompanying notes 247-50
supra.
266. See notes 257 & 258 supra.
267. "The issue was considered at great length, and Congress clearly expressed
its purpose and intent." 101 S. Ct. at 2656.
268. Id.; see note 263 & 265 supra.
269. Men do not appear to be too happy about bearing the military burden
alone. "The nation's 18-year-olds are failing to register for the draft at a rate far
greater than during the Vietnam War .... over 300,000 men, or 23% of those born in
1963, [have] violated [a] federal law requiring them to register." LA. Times, Nov.
5, 1981, at 1, col. 5. Some feel that adding women to the registration pool would
decrease opposition, allowing those who most oppose the military service to be
2. Military Life May Not Be For Everyone
As the Supreme Court has ruled, military life may not be for
everyone-especially not for women. Undoubtedly, many women
are happy to avoid the burdens of soldiering. Alternatively, wo-
men are not happy about not sharing in the benefits that the na-
tion's largest employer has to offer.270 Although the All Volunteer
Force is comprised of roughly seven percent women,271 the
Rostker decision denies women's usefulness or value in a time of
emergency.272
Ironically, women have already proved themselves in the mili-
tary,273 yet the proof was not enough to convince Congress or the
Supreme Court that men and women are equally suited to defend
their country.274 Studies of the military show that men lose more
days of work due to drugs, alcohol, or bad behavior than women,
the All Volunteer Force will be having recruiting problems as the
given exemptions. The larger the population the Selective Service pulls from, the
more exemptions there are. For a comprehensive discussion, see Goodman, ifra
note 270, at 250.
270. See Hale & Kanowitz, supra note 182 at 207-10; Goodman, Women, War,
Equality: An Examination of Sex Discrimination in the Military, 5 WOMEN'S RTS.
L. REP. 243, 244-45 (1979). See also notes 281-284 infra.
271. The military plans to increase the number of women in the service to
11.6% of the total force by 1984. In 1969 women represented only 0.9% of the total
force. OFFICE OF THE Asst SEC'Y OF DEFENSE, BACKGROUND STUDY: USE OF WO-
MEN IN THE M=urARY, F-19, F-21 (2d ed. 1978).
272. A 1978 Department of Defense study concluded the following:
Significant savings and quality improvement are possible through the
expanded use of enlisted women. Cost avoidance could exceed $1 billion
annually by 1982.
Continued expansion of the number of enlisted women used in the mili-
tary can be an important factor in making the all volunteer force continue
to work.
Goodman, supra note 270, at 249. In addition, women are able to work in: 323 job
classifications out of 345 in the Army; 226 out of 230 in the Air Force; 83 out of 99 in
the Navy; and 34 out of 38 in the Marine Corps. See Note, supra note 26, at 412
n.45.
273. Army studies show field performance of units with significant female
membership was equal to that of all-male units. Note, supra note 26, at 412 n.47;
M. BINyIN & J. BACH, supra note 236, at 77-101. Senator Cohen stated: "Participa-
tion of women in the All-Volunteer Force has worked well, has been praised by
every military officer who has testified before the committee, and.. .the jobs are
being performed with the same, if not in some cases, with superior skill." Defense
Authorization Bill, Fical Year, 1981: Hearings on S. 2294 Before the Senate Comm.
on Armed Sertices, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1678 (1980) (testimony of Senator Cohen).
274. Not only have women proved effective in military activity but "Women
have been conspicuous in some of the more notorious terrorist groups such as the
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP), the Croation Nationalists (USTA SHI), and the Baader-Meinhof Gang.
M. BNKIN & J. BACH, supra note 236, at 91. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Elmo Zumwalt, spoke out in support of an expanded role for women. They
should, he said, "have opportunity to go into combat... and thus far as women
soldiers are concerned, when I was in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War I
found that among the most vicious fighters were the Viet Cong women." Id. at 50.
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number of male youths drops and unemployment decreases, 275
and that women in the military are more apt to have a high school
diploma and score higher on standardized tests than military
men.276 Clearly, women, together with men, should be allowed to
be an integral part of the Armed Forces.
But, beyond these military concerns, the Rostker decision has a
striking impact on women as civilians.277 In granting deference to
Congress in military decisions, the Court has overlooked its role
in civilian affairs. Indeed, the registration of individuals for the
military deals with civilian rights, and it is not until one is in-
ducted that the jurisdiction of the military takes over.
The Court has previously noted the differences between civilian
society and military society, and has allowed Congress more
power to regulate in the latter.2 78 Yet, with such an important as-
pect of citizenship as the right to fight for one's country at stake,
the Court has let military law279 dictate the privileges and respon-
sibilities of women in the civilian sphere.
Basically, Rostker has turned the tide in women's equality; spe-
cifically, it has turned it back. Beyond the military flexibility and
the noncombat issues that the Court dealt with is the reality that
women have less opportunity for education, 80 advancement, self-
275. See generally id. at 62-63, 127. The all volunteer force has problems recruit-
ing men of the caliber it needs and in the quantity it needs them. In response,
Congress has lowered its quotas for armed services enlistment to avoid lowering
the standards of enlistment.
276. See note 26 supra at 412.
277. Proposed Amendments to the Equal Rights Amendment: Hearings on S.J.
Res. 61 and S.J. 231 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
326 (1970) (statement of Prof. Norman Dorsen).
[WJhen women are excluded from the draft-the most serious and on-
erous duty of citizenship--their status is generally reduced. The social
stereotype is that women should be less concerned with the affairs of the
world than men. Our political choices and our political debate often re-
flect a belief that men who have fought for their country have a special
qualification or right to wield political power and make political decisions.
Women are in no position to meet this qualification.
Id.
278. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (Congress given broad authority to
make laws in military society which would be invalidated if applied to civilian so-
ciety). See generally note 218 supra. Thus, the Court's reliance on the deferential
standard in Roskter is misplaced because registration impacts on the rights and
liabilities of civilians, not militarypersonnel.
279. See notes 2 & 244 supra.
280. Educational opportunities are a big factor in attracting men to the military.
Many men would never have been able to continue their education without assist-
improvement,81 economic benefit,282 and learning valuable skills
which can be transferred to civilian life.283 These are just some of
the benefits284 of taking on the responsibility or burden of service
in the military. Current enlistment demonstrates that women are
ready and able to accept the responsiblity of military duty and
thereby attain full citizenship status alongside men.
The case for women's involvement in the military is compelling
when the facts of women's performance and the overall good ef-
fect of women in the military are weighed against the stereotypi-
cal notion that women must stay home and men should support
and protect them. Unfortunately, a decision based on such an as-
sumption is clearly not based on the reality of today's world
where women play a major role in home life as well as in the
working world.
E. Conclusion
Caught in a double bind with the passage of the Equal Rights
Amendment still pending285 and a Supreme Court seemingly un-
willing to acknowledge the inequalities in the MSSA, women will
have to try another route to attain full citizenship beside men.
ance from the military. Hale & Kanowitz, supra note 184, at 208. See Veterans'
Benefit Act 38 U.S.C. 1652-799 (1976) (education for veterans and their families).
281. For men, the military is a vehicle for upward mobility, a chance to earn a
better wage and strive to reach one's potential by learning job skills of which over
600 are offered. Women would be offered a chance to be judged by ability rather
than sexual attractiveness in such a setting. Id. at 207-09.
282. Benefits include housing, retirement annuities, medical care and wages
above those obtainable in the civilian market. M. BmniN & J. BACH, upra note
236, at 31-36.
283. The military teaches skills applicable to future careers in law enforcement,
electronics, mechanics and commercial piloting. The military trains around 80% of
the nation's commercial pilots. Goodman, supra note 270, at 244 n.18.
284. The Court was speaking about veterans benefits. "To the contrary it con-
fers upon a specifically described group.perceived to be particularly deserving-
a competitive head start." Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277 (1979) (em-
phasis added).
285. Justice Powell stated in 1973 that the Supreme Court was hesitant to step
into the area of equal rights in gender-based discrimination cases because of the
pending Equal Rights Amendment. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692
(1973). The implication of Justice Powell's statement is that if the Court were to
implement the highest level of scrutiny in such cases before the passage of the
Equal Rights Amendment, it would be engaging in judicial legislation rather than
judicial interpretation. But the fourteenth amendment Equal Protection Clause
applies to all persons, including women. In Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
162 (1874), the Court ruled that "women" were "persons" within the meaning of
the Constitution. Thus, affirmative application of the fourteenth amendment by
the Court could achieve greater equality in sex discrimination cases without being
called judicial legislation. Instead, based upon the tenuous reasoning that wo-
men's rights were not on the minds of our forefathers, the Court has steadfastly
refused to accord women equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. See
also note 7 supra.
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The request of Ms. Grimke in 1838 is still pertinent today. "I ask
no favors for my sex. I surrender not our claim to equality. All I
ask of our brethren is, that they will take their feet from our
necks... ,"286 Women want equal standing with men and have
waited a long time for a declaration of that equality.
However, as the Court in Rostker concluded, the time has not
yet come when men will allow women the full privileges and bur-
dens of registration for military service. 287 It appears that the
Burger Court will not be remembered for its great strides toward
equality for women. For, as Justice Rehnquist reasoned in the
majority opinion, it is not the job of the Supreme Court to make
law, but simply to review it.288 There is, however, a faint possibil-
ity that the Court will reconsider its stand on the application of
the "important governmental interest" test as a new Justice takes
her rightful place on the Supreme Court this year.28 9
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Rostker v. Goldberg has, for
the time being, resolved at least one issue: women will not be
registered to serve in the Armed Forces. However, the decision
leaves many more questions unanswered.
Although Rostker was decided primarily on a separation of pow-
ers rationale, it is yet to be determined whether the case will
stand as authority to apply a lower level of review to sex discrimi-
nation in more than just a military context.
In addition, Rostker appears to reinforce the view that Congress
has unlimited power to oversee military affairs, even if the legisla-
tion enacted also affects civilian life.
Furthermore, has the Court really based its decision on the def-
erence given to Congressional wisdom in military affairs, or does
this decision signal a retreat from an otherwise affirmative ap-
proach to sex discrimination?
Looking at the case in its totality, at both its legal and social
286. S. GRIMKE, LETrERS ON THE EQUALrrY OF THE SEXES AND THE CONDTION OF
WOMEN 10 (Boston 1838).
287. See note 278 supra.
288. 101 S. Ct. at 2653.
289. Sandra Day O'Connor was sworn in October 5, 1981, the first Monday in
October, 1981. It was also the first time a woman entered the United States
Supreme Court chambers as a Justice of the United States Supreme Court. L.A.
Times, Oct. 5, 1981 at 1, col 5.
consequences, it is clear that the debate is not over. Whether it is
viewed as an afflrmation of congressional power, or as a step
backward in equal protection, the answers to the questions posed
by this decision can only be supplied through future interpreta-
tions of this case.
GILBERT L. PURCELL
JANET RAPPAPORT
